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[Crim. No. 4648. In Bank. Feb. 15, 1946.J 
. THE PEOPLE, .Appellant, v. BART MITCHELL, 
.".. Respondent. 
[1] Criminal Law-Preliminary Proceedings-Holding to Answer 
-Sufficient Cause.-In a preliminary examination it is not 
necessary that a defendant tie proved guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt in order to support an order holding him to answer 
in the superior court. A "reasonable or probable cause" for 
such commitment exists if there is sufficient proof to make 
it reasonable to believe that defendant is guilty of the offense 
charged. (See Pen. Code, § 995.) 
[2] HOmicide-Involuntary Manslaughter.-A person commits an 
unlawful act within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 192, if he 
violates speed laws designed to prevent injury to the person, 
and he is guilty of involuntary manslaughter if death is 
caused thereby. 
[3] Criminal Law-Preliminary Proceedings-Holding to Answer 
-Sufficient Cause.-The committing magistrate was justified 
in holding defendant to answer in the superior court on a 
[1] See 7 Cal.Jm. 982. 
[2J Manslaughter in connection with use of automobile far 
unlawful purpose or in violation of law, notes, 16 A.L.B. 914; 
59 A.L.B. 695; 99 A.L.B. 756. See, also, 5 Am.Jur. 925. 
McX. Dig. References: [1, 3] Criminal Law, § 175; [2] Homi·· 
cide, § 26; [4, 5] Homicide, § 25a; [6, 7J Criminal Law, § llOG,. 
[8J Criminal Law, § 1248 (3). 
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[4) 
(6) 
[6] 
[7] 
. [8] 
charge of involuntary manslaughter where it was reasonable 
to conclude from the evidence before such magistrate that 
defendant drove his automobile in violation of the speed 
laws and in reckless disregard for the safety of others. 
"t 
Homicide-Involuntan- Homicide-Negligent Homicide.-The 
1941 amendment ta'Veh. Code, § 500, that provisions of the 
Penal Code defini!fg involuntary manslaughter should not apply 
to homicide caused by the driving of allY vehicle, prevented 
dual liability under Veh. Code, .... ~ 500. n'1d P(,D. Code, § 192, for 
the same conduct. "'! • 
Id.-Involuntary Homicide-Negligent Homicide.-The 1941 
amendment of Vch. Code, § 500, did not repeal Pen. Code, 
§§ 192, 193 j it left those sections in force but excepted from 
their operation homicide caused by the driving of a vehicle. 
When the exception was taken away by a subsequent statute, 
these sections were then to be applied without the exception. 
Criminal La.w-Appeal-Exceptions-Office and Purpose.-An 
exception is a formal protest against a ruling of the court, 
and its purpose is to canse the question of law to be made a 
matter of record so that it may be reexamined by the court 
on motion for new trial or be reviewed by the appellate 
court. 
lei. - Appeal-Exceptions-Necessity. - In eriminal cases an 
exception is obsolete. 
ld. - Appeal- Dismissal.-An appeal may not be dismissed 
for failure to take an exception where such exception, if 
required, Deed Dot be taken from an appealable order, such 
as an order dismissing an information. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San 
Diego County dismissing an information. Gordon Thomp-
son, Judge. Reversed. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Frank Richards, 
Deputy Attorney General, Thomas Whelan, District At-
torney, and Eugene R. Dukette, Deputy District Attorney, 
for Appellant. 
Edgar B. Hervey and Henry F. Walker for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant was charged by information 
with involuntary manslaughter alleged to have been com-
(6] See 8 CaLJur. 511; 3 Am.Jur. 47. 
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mitted in violation of subdivision 2 of section 192 of the Penal 
Code. The superior court on motion of defendant entered 
an order dismissing the information on the ground that the 
evidence before the committing magistrate was insufficient to 
justify holding the defendant for trial. The People appeal. 
The record on appeabdoes 119t include the reporter's tran-
script of the eviden~ at the preliminary examination. The 
reporter's transcript of the $roceedings in the superior court, 
however, includes a summary by counsel for defendant of the 
evidence taken at the prelimi~ary examination, which coun-
sel for the prosecution agreed 'was a "rair and complete sumo. ! 
mary of all the evidence before the committing magistrate. 
This summary was given by counsel for defendant in pre- j 
senting his motion to enable the court to pass on the suffi-
ciency of the evidence at the preliminary examination. De-
fendant has no cause to complain if his counsel's summary is 
used by this court for the same purpose. 
On October 30, 1944, at about six o'clock in the evening, 
defendant drove his car in a southerly direction on Park 
Boulevard and Twelfth A venue in San Diego. An accident 
occurred on Twelfth A venue near the intersection of Park 
Boulevard and Russ Street. The part of Park Boulevard 
involved herein runs in a general northerly and southerly 
direction across Balboa Park. As it approaches the main 
buildings of the United States Naval Hospital from the north 
it makes a broad curve to the west, returns into a slight curve 
to the east. and joins the north end of Twelfth Avenue at. 
Russ Street. Commencing near the hospital the grade of Park 
Boulevard descends to the south. A streetcar track runs along 
the east side of the boulevard, crosses RUSR Street, and pro-
ceeds south on Twelfth Avenue. Both Park Boulevard and 
Twelfth Avenue are main thoroughfares and at times carry 
considerable vehieular traffic. There is a 25-mile an hour I 
speed limit sign on the west side of Park Boulevard about· 
180 feet north of the north line of Russ Street. 
The evidence as summarized by defendant's counsel shows 
that defendant drove bis automobile downgrade on Park: 
Boulevard at such a high rate of speed that when he came I. 
upon a streetcar that had stopped south of Russ Street tol 
take on and discharge passengers. be could not stop his auw.:l 
mobile behind the streetcar. He swerved to the left to avoid;' 
hitting passengel'R and collided with the left rear corner of i 
the streetcar thereby losing control of his automobile. The' 
automobile eame to rest against a trolley-line-aupport pol~{ 
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whi~h was broken by the impact. A police officer who arrived 
at the scene after the accident gave a description of his find-
ings, quoted by counsel as,foUows: "He says this: 'The rear 
of the streetcar at the point contact was made between the 
car and the streetcar, wlS approximately eighty-one feet south 
of the south line of RUBS. Prior to this point running up to 
the end of the streetcar wlls approximately twenty-seven feet 
of centrifugal skid'~owing a~ application of the brake..<; 
about twenty-seven feet before the collision-'leading from 
the point of impact to where the car was setting was approxi-
mately fifty-one feet of centrifltgal skid.' In other words, 
there was a skid mark fifty-one feet after the contact with 
the streetcar and twenty-seven feet before. At the point 
where the car was resting, a support pole which supports 
the trolley lines for the streetcar, was broken oft at the base. 
Also an ornamental light standard which was alongside the 
support pole, was badly damaged." Two United States Navy 
Waves who were walking west on RuBS Street observed the 
accident. One testified concerning the speed of the auto-
mobile: "We thought it was going very rapidly, and in my 
opinion about seventy." The other testified that it was 
travelling "very fast" that when she first saw the auto-
mobile "it was going around a eurve," and that "as it 
turned to its left coming around the curve • . • it was on 
two wheels . . . the right front and the right rear wheels, 
and ..• the other wheels were in the air." Harvey An-
derson, who WaR riding with defendant, died of injuries 
received in the accident. 
The question presented at the outset is whether the superior 
court was justified in holding that there W88 not sufficient 
cause to believe the defendant guilty of the offense charged. 
[1] In a preliminary examination it is not necessary that a 
defendant be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. "Rea-
sonable or probable cause." required to uphold the comInit-
ment of a defendant (Pen. Code § 995), exists if there is 
suflicient proof to make it reasonable to believe that the de-
fendant is guilty of the oftense charged. (Pen. Code, § 872; 
People v. Tallman, ante, pP. 209. 212 fIG3 P.2d 857]; People 
v. O'Brien, 37 Cal.App.2d 708, 712 [100 P.2d 3671; People 
v. Fisk, 32 Cal.App.2d 26. 30 [89 P.2d 142]; People •• 
Novell, 54 Cal.App.2d 621, 623 [129 P.2d 453].) 
Subdivision 2 of section 192 of the Penal Code u ii read 
/ 
/ 
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at the time of the alleged offense- defined involuntary man-
slaughter as "the unlawful killing of a human being, without. 
malice ... in the commission of an unlawful act, not amount-
ing to a felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which 
might produce death, In an unlawful manner, or without 
due caution and ci.eumspection." 
The accident occ~ed after defendant had passed a sign 
declaring the speed limit in that district to be 25 miles an 
hour. The evidence shows VKithout conflict that his speed 
was not only in excess of th~ limit, which is prescribed for 
residential or business districts where signs are in place 
giving notice thereof. but in excess of the 55-mile an hour 
limit, which applies unless a different speed limit is estab-
lished. (Veh. Code, § 511.) It must therefore be determined 
whether there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant 
was committing an unlawful act or was committing a lawful 
act in an unlawful manner within the meaning of section 192 
of the Penal Code. Section 510 of the Vehicle Code, the vio-
lation of which is a misdemeanor under section 763 of 
the code (I'll. re Johnson, 6 Cal.App.2d 654, 656 [45 P.2d 
241]; People v. Banat, 39 Cal.App.2d Supp. 765, 768 [100 
P.2d 374]; see Knoz v. Pryor, 10 Ca1.App.2d 76, 78 [51 P.2d 
·Section 192 was amended In 1945 to read 88 follows: 
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without 
malice. It is of thret> kinds: 
"1. Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or beat of passion. 
"2. Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting 
to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce 
death, in an unlawful manner. or without due caution and circumspec- I 
tion; provided that this subdivision shall not apply to acts committed 
in the driving of a vehicle. 
"3. In the driving of a vehicle-
"(a) In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, 
with gross negligence; or in the commission of a lawful act which 
might produce death, in an unlawful manner, and with gross negligence. 
neb) In the commission of an nnlawful act, not amounting to felony, 
without gross negligence; or in the commission of a lawful act which 
might proilullE' dPllth. in an nnlawful manner. but without grOSll neg-
ligence. 
"This section mall not be construed as making any bomicide in the 
driving of a vehicle punishable which is not a proximate result of 
the commi88ion of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony, or of the 
commission of II lawful Mt which miJ!;ht !,Todnl'l' ileath in an unlawful I 
manner." 
Since the Legislature bas not. exrreBSly declared that violations of the I 
IeCtion 88 it formerly read shal not be prosecuted thereunder, the.: 
eeetion as it read at the time of the commission of the offense ill to ' 
.be applied. (Gov. Code, § 9608; Be1et v. Justices Court, 26 CaL2d 197, : 
aoo [159 P.2d 17]; lee' Cal..Tur. 10-Yr. Supp. 546.) . .,,1 
"I ...... , 
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106]), provides that "No person shall drive a vehicle upon a 
highway at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent 
having due regard for the traffic on, and the surface and 
widt.h of, the highwa~ and in no event at a speed which en-
dangers the safety of pe~ons or property." A prima facie 
case of violation of thi~o;;eC'tion arises if the speed of a vehicle 
exceeds t.he limits prescrihe<1 ill sect.ion 511 "unless thp de-
fendant establishes by competent evidence t.hat any said speed 
in excess of said limit.s did not .constitute a violation of the 
basic rule declared in Section nl0 hereof at the time, place, 
and under the condit.ion!;: then existing." nefendant has 
shown no circumstances explainin~ why his speed did not 
constitute a violation of the basiC' rllle declared in section 510. 
In some jurisdictions it has been held that the commission 
of a misdemeanor is not an unlawful act within the meaning 
of involuntary manslaughter !!tatute.o;; like section 192 of the 
Penal Code, if the punishable act is malum prohibitum rather 
than malum in se. (See 40 C .• 1.S_ 923; 5 Am.Jur. 925.) It is 
generally recognized, however, that the violation of speed 
regulations is an unlawful act within the meanin~of such 
statutes. Thus in State v. 'A/eIt'er. 175 N.C. 761. 766 r94 S.E. 
6821. the court referred to the distinction between malum 
in se and malum prohibitum, stating: "It is, however. prac-
tically agreed, without rega.rd t.o this distinction. t.hat if the 
act is a violation of a !rtat.ute intended and designed to prevent 
injury to the person. Rnd is in itself dangerous. and death 
ensues. that the person violatinl! t.he crratut.e is jroilty of 
manslaughter at least. . . _" rOommonwea.7.th v. Ramso1/. 130 
Pa.Sup.Ct .. 65 fJ96 A. 5641: sel" 40 C .• }.S. 924: 29 C.J. 
1153: 1 Wharton. Criminal Law 12th ed. § 157. note 10.) [aJ In this state it is settled that a person commits an unlaw-
ful act within the meaning- of !tection 192 1f he violates speed 
laws designed to prevent injury to the person. and that he 
is guilty of involuntary manslaughter 1f death ill caused 
thereby. (People v. W~7son, 193 Cal. 512. 516 r226 P. 5); 
People v, Oollins. ]95 Cal. 32!'i. 348 f233 P. 97]: People v. 
Seiler, 57 Cal.App. 195. 199 f207 P. 3961: People v. Cun-
ningham, 64 CalApp. 12, 20 f220 P. 3121: People v. Kelly, 
70 Cal.App. 519. 523 r234 P 1101: People v. V01/ Ecko,rls-
berg, 133 Ca1.App. 1. 5 [23 P.2d ~191 : !tee People v, 'Mclnf1Ire. 
213 Cal. 50, 55-56 fl P.2d 4431: 16 A.TJ.R. 914: 59 A.hR. 
695: 99 A.L.R. 756: 41 C .• l. ] 355. ) rS] From the evidence 
before the committing magistrate in the present case it would 
I 
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be reasonable to conclud(' that defenoant drove hiR auto-
mobile not only in do~atj()n of su~h Inwl'l hut in rerklcss 
disregard for the safety of others. The committing magis-
trate was thererore fu]]y jURtified in holding defendant to 
answer in thJt superior court. 
[4J Defendant contends that at the time of the accident, 
the killing of a pezwn by negligent operation of an auto-
mobile was not punisllitble as involuntary manslaughter. In 
1941 section 500 of the Vehicle Code waR amended to read 
aR fo]]ows: "When the death "of any person enSUeR within 
one year as the proximate resillt of injuries caused by the 
driving of any vehicle with reckle'ls disregard of. or willful 
indifference to, the safety of others. the person so operating 
such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide, a felony. 
and upon conviction thereof l'Ihal1 be puniRhable by imprison-
ment in the county jail for not more t.han one year or in the 
State prison for not more than three years. Hereafter. t.he 
proviRions of the Penal Code, defining involuntary man-
slaughter. shall not apply to homicide ('aused by the driving 
of any vehicle." (Stats. 1941. 1414.) Tb(' l'Ientence 1aRt 
quoted prevented dual liability under section 500 of the 
Vehicle Code and !let'tion 192 of the Penal Code for the same 
conduct. (See People v. Amick. 20 Ca1.2d 247 [125 P.2d 25].) 
[5J In 1943 the Legislature adopted an "act to amend See-
tion 193 of the Penal Code and to repeal Section 500 of the 
Vehicle Code, relatin!! to crimes involving t.he operation of 
vehiclel'l." (Stats. 1943. p. 1959.) nefendant argue" thRt 
the latter act. by repealinlZ section !'iOO of the Vehicle Code. 
removed any criminal liability for causing thE' death tlf 
another by negligent oneration of a motor vehicle. He eon-
tends that sectionR 192 and 193 of the Penal Code were 
repealed b~' the 1941 amendment to section 500 of the Vehicle· 
Code in so far aR they applied to homicide caused by the driv-
ing of a vehicle, and that it was n~essary t.o provide expressly 
for their revival to make them again applicahlE' t.o snch homi-
cide. Defendant relies on the provision in "Iection 9607 of 
the Government CodE' that "No crt.atut.e or part of a statute. 
{'epealed by another statute. is revived by the repeal of the 
repealing !!tatute without expre'l.'I wordl'l reviving such re-
pealed statute OJ' part of a !¢at.ute." ThE' 1941 amendment 
to section fiOO of thE' VehiclE' Code. however. did not repeal • 
RectionR 192 and 193 of the Penal Code. It left those section!!' 
in force but exempted from their operation homicide cal1!~ed, 
'by the driving of a vehicle. When the exception was taken 
/ 
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away, these sections were then to be applied without the 
exception. (People v. El'l/, 71 Cal.App.2d 729 [163 P.2d 
453).) "The rule of law applicable to this situation is well 
stated as follows: 'The ftatutory rule against the revival of a 
statute by the repeal of a repealing act relates to absolute 
repeals, and not to cases where a statute is left in force and 
all that is done in the way of repeal is to except certain cases 
from its operation. I~ such cases the statute does not need 
to be revived, for it remains in force, and the exception being 
taken away, the statute is afterwards to be applied without 
the exception; .. .' (25 R.C.L."'934)." (County of Ventura 
v. Barry, 202 Cal. 550, 554 r262 P. 1081).) Moreover, the 
statute repealing section 500 of the Vehicle Code showed 
clearly that the Legislature intended sections 192 and 193 
to apply thereafter to homicide caused by the driving of a 
vehicle, for it provided that section 193 of the Penal Code be 
amended to read: "Manslaughter is punishable by imprison-
ment in the State Prison for not exceeding 10 years, except 
that a violation of subdivision 2 of Section 192 of this code 
resulting from the operation of a vehicle is punishable by 
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year 
or in the State Prison for not more than five years." The 
special limitation upon the punishment of one who commits 
involuntary manslaughter in the operation of a vehicle would 
be meaningless if the Legislature had not intended to make 
such a person punishable for involuntary manslaughter. 
Defendant contends that this appeal should be dismissed 
because of the failure of the People to take an exception to 
the trial court's order granting defendant's motion to dis-
miss the information. Defendant's theory is that section 
1259 of the Penal Code provides that a defendant may 
have a ruling reviewed on appeal without taking an ex-
ception therefrom, but that no comparable provision gives 
such privilege to the People. He concludes, therefore, that 
the People cannot review any ruling on appeal unless a 
formal exception has been noted in the trial court. This 
argument is based upon a misconception of the function 
of the exception and the nature of appellate jurisdiction. 
[6] The exception is a formal protest against a ruling 
of the court, which was of considerable importance when 
the record consisted of a bill of exceptions. Its purpose was 
to "cause the question of law, which was presented to and 
decided by the Court, to be made a matter of record, 80 that 
J 
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it may be re-examined by the Court on motion for a new trial, 
or be reviewed by the appellate COlllrt." (Smith v. Lawrence, 
38 Cal. 24, 27 [99 Am.Dec. 316]; see 3 Am.Jur. 47.) The 
widespread usc of the reporter's transcript as the record on 
appeal and the modernization of the bill of exceptions into 
a narrative statemellt of the proceedings ~ee Rules on Appeal, 
rule 7), have re.c;ufted in the practical disappearance of the 
formal exception in appellate procedure in this state. [7] The 
fact that in criminal cases the record must be a reporter's 
transcript, unless it is unobts.inable (rules 33, 36), is further 
evidence that the exception in criminal cases is obsolete. 
[8] Irrespective of these considerations, however, there 
is no force to the contention that an appeal may be dismissed 
for failure to take an exception to the order or judgment ap-
pealed from. Exceptions, if required, are taken from inter-
mediate rulings in the course of a proceeding to enable the 
aggrieved party to have such rulings reviewed on his appeal 
The scope of review on appeal is entirely different from ju-
risdiction of the appeal. When a judgment or order is appeal-
able, as is the order dismissing an information in this case 
(Pen. Code, § 1238), appellate jurisdiction attaches upon 
the proper and timely filing of a notice of appeal. There-
after, if a record on appeal is filed, the appellate court must 
determine the matter on the merits. If any ruling in the court 
below was not the subject of a proper objection by the appel-
lant, the appellate court may deem the error waived and 
decide against the appellant on the merits; but it cannot dis-
miss an appeal because the appellant has, by failure to make 
such proper objection, limited the scope of review. 
Stated briefly, there is no more purpose in taking an excep-
tion to an appealable order than there is in taking an 
exception to a final judgment. The exception is only a for-. 
mal type of objection, and there is no more formal type of 
objection known to the law than a notice of appeal from an' 
appealable order or judgment. (Smith v. Lawrence, 38 Cal. 
24, 27 [99 Am.Dec. 344]; Denver County Commrs. v. Home. 
Savings Bank, 236 U.S. 101, 104 [35 8.Ct. 265, 59 L.Ed.: 
485]; United States v. La Fmnca, 282 U.S. 568, 570 [51 S.l; 
Ct. 278, 75 L.Ed. 551]; see 3 Am.Jur. 47; 4 C.J.S. 662.); 
The order dismissing the information is reversed. t4 (,tt 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,,) 
J., and Spence, J., concurred.,~ 
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